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The Japanese Economy and the Aftermath of Its Unusual Recession 
About a year ago at this time, while East Asia was steadily growing, there were two 
notable exceptions: one was China, whose problem was overheating; and the other Japan, whose 
problem was either underheating or overcooling. Now, while China's problems remain 
unsettled, the Japanese economy at long last seems to have bottomed out, although its upturn is 
expected to be moderate. Since spring of this year there have been a number of positive signs 
emerging in the Japanese economy, particularly in connection with public expenditure, housing 
investment, and personal consumption. 
There are a number of factors responsible for the end of the deterioration of the Japanese 
economy and the beginning of its improvement: the progress of inventory adjustment, both in 
the corporate sector and in the household sector; a very hot summer which induced large 
purchases of summer goods; income tax reduction which finally took place early this summer; 
decline in prices of many goods due to appreciation of the yen and the stimulative impact of the 
deflated prices; and finally, the renewed rise of Japanese exports to the United States and East 
Asia reflecting the stronger performance of these economies. 
Despite these positive factors, however, it is widely agreed in Japan that the recovery will 
be very moderate, particularly in view of the continued weakness of capital spending and the 
absence of readily available and effective policy measures, with the exception of the recently 
agreed upon extension of the income tax reduction. According to most private forecasters, after 
negative growth during the April-June quarter, real growth for fiscal 1994 will be approximately 
1 percent, followed by about 2 percent real growth in fiscal 1995. The Japanese government 
alone sticks to its original forecast of 2.4 percent for fiscal 1994. 
In addition, we cannot overlook a number of serious problems which continue to 
overshadow the Japanese economy. Problem one is the aftermath of asset inflation and asset 
deflation since the late 1980s. Because of ample liquidity, low interest rates, falling purchases 
and official support, the deterioration of the stock market in Japan has come to a halt. But the 
market remains very stagnant, reflecting the continued corporate profit squeeze and the 
liquidation or unloading of traditional cross shareholdings between major companies. Also, land 
prices continue to decline. According to standard price statistics, prices dropped about 8 percent 
in Tokyo from 1993 to 1994, and the commercial property market is especially depressed. This 
situation presents difficult problems for financial institutions, particularly smaller ones. Luckily, 
larger banks have made some progress in restructuring their balance sheets, due to more 
favorable tax treatment for writing off bad assets. Under the circumstances, bankers are very 
cautious with new lending, and anyway, demand for credit is very moderate; the growth of bank 
credit has been almost nil for the past few months. Bitter experience during the years of 
excessive boom and bust continues to discourage the adoption of drastic measures for asset 
markets. It will take several more years to overcome the aftermath of wide fluctuations of asset 
prices. 
Problem two is the stimulative impact of deflated prices. During the oil crisis, the 
inflated price of oil finally depressed the demand for it. At present in Japan an opposite trend 
is emerging. Prices are down due to the prolonged recession and the sharp appreciation of the 
Japanese yen in the exchange market. These depressed prices have stimulated consumer 
demand-one of the factors of the recovery. As far as the consumers are concerned, the rise of 
consumer demand due to lower prices should be welcome. But from the point of view of 
domestic producers, things are not that simple. In the past, whenever consumer demand began 
to strengthen, domestic producers were able to expect higher prices and larger profits over time. 
But now, if they try to raise the prices of their products prematurely, foreign goods whose prices 
are also depressed by the yen's appreciation will penetrate the Japanese market, since it is more 
open to foreign products than ever before, or consumer demand will recede. In other words, 
for the first time in Japan's recent history, it is possible that strengthened consumer demand will 
not automatically increase profits of domestic producers unless they also manage to improve 
their productivity. This phenomenon is the combined result of import penetration and the 
greater price consciousness of Japanese consumers. 
Problem three is the impact of the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen. At 100 yen 
per U.S. dollar, the exchange rate has already exceeded the level considered acceptable by many 
economists and industrialists in Japan. This sharp rise is due to at least three factors. First is 
the continuation of Japan's large current account surplus due to the renewed rise of exports 
despite the steady rise of imports. Second is the continued reluctance of Japanese institutional 
investors to invest in foreign currency denominated securities because of their concern about 
possible exchange losses. Japanese institutional investors suffered from enormous exchange 
losses in the 1980s when the yen started to rise and the dollar started to decline. Those 
exchange losses were covered by capital gains in the Tokyo stock market. But today, in view 
of the stagnant stock market, Japanese institutional investors do not have any buffer which could 
cover the possible exchange losses. Third is the unfortunate perception in the markets that any 
intensification of trade frictions between Japan and its trading partners, particularly the United 
States, is almost automatically interpreted as a sign that the yen will become stronger in the 
exchange markets. 
While the appreciated yen is reducing import prices and increasing import volume, it is 
also delaying the recovery of the Japanese economy. In addition, many Japanese manufacturing 
industries have been forced to shift their operations to other countries. Furthermore there are 
signs of the shift of financial service activities from Japan to other more liberalized financial 
centers, not necessarily because of the high yen but rather because of delayed deregulation, 
higher taxes, and the higher cost of living and operations in Japan. And the ratio of overseas 
operations of Japanese industries is much smaller than that of their American and European 
counterparts. Thus it is possible that many leading Japanese industries will invest more and 
more in foreign countries rather than in Japan. Such an outward shift is likely to be 
concentrated in East Asia because these countries are closer, more familiar, and more promising 
to Japanese investors than other areas, and will appear as further Asianization of Japanese 
industries or Japanese industrial expansion in Asia. While such a trend will make a positive 
contribution to the further growth of our Asian neighbors as well as help capable Japanese 
industries and companies to survive by shifting their operations abroad, it will also lead to a 
hollowing out of Japan proper. This hollowing out will have a serious impact on the domestic 
employment situation, which is already a major problem due to the downsizing of Japanese 
industries following the prolonged recession. Of course, Japan's employment situation is still 
much better than that of many other countries, with the unemployment level holding steady at 
3 percent. 
Problem four is whether Japanese traditional business practices will have to be modified, 
if not completely abandoned, during the present process of adjustment. I will address two such 
practices: lifetime employment and cross shareholding. During the recent recession, Japanese 
companies first tried to adjust inventory by cutting production. Then they tried to adjust 
equipment by cutting capital spending plans, thereby postponing employment adjustment. 
However, since late 1992, they have been forced to begin some types of employment adjustment, 
first by cutting part-time workers, reducing bonuses and cutting over-time pay. Since last year, 
these companies have moved to another stage, in which they are narrowing the entry of new 
labor by reducing the number of new recruits and enlarging the exit of old labor by encouraging 
older employees to retire earlier or shifting them to lower paying subsidiaries while retaining 
their well-trained, middle-aged employees. In the meantime, the seniority system which used 
to be linked very closely with the lifetime employment practice has already been modified. 
Views are divided among executives of leading companies. The majority believe that even if 
modified, the lifetime employment practice should be and will be maintained since it is the 
foundation of Japan's peaceful, cooperative management and business relations. There are 
those, however, who believe that drastic changes in Japan's employment practices will be 
necessary in order to survive keener international competition. 
Until recently the bulk of shares of major companies in Japan were owned by other major 
companies. In this way they were able to avoid sudden hostile takeovers. Since tradeable shares 
were therefore limited, their prices were kept high, one of the reasons for relatively high stock 
prices in the past. Now after the prolonged recession, many companies have been forced to 
unload or liquidate some of their shares of other companies. Such unloading seems to be linked 
to the level of stock prices. When the Nikkei index went below 19,000 yen, unloading increased 
and depressed stock prices further, thereby accelerating further unloading. But once stock prices 
recovered to the 19,000 or 20,000 level, the unloading appeared to stop. Again views are 
divided. Recently the chairman of one of the leading securities houses in Japan told the foreign 
press in Tokyo that cross shareholding will not be maintained. In my opinion, all will depend 
on the pace of the recovery and the situation of the Japanese stock market. 
In conclusion, special attention should be paid to the following three points when looking 
at the Japanese economy in the coming months: first, the pace of the recovery of the Japanese 
macroeconomy as well as corporate performance, and also the pace of the balance of payments 
adjustment-my short answer is that both will be slow and moderate; second, whether the current 
adjustment process of the Japanese economy will force Japanese industries, including banks, to 
modify their traditional business practices such as lifetime employment and cross shareholding-
my short answer is that some modification will be inevitable; third, the impact of Japanese 
industrial restructuring on the economy of the Asia Pacific region-in my view, Japan's slow 
recovery may not necessarily mean the slower growth of the region, partly because of the 
outward shift of Japanese industry operations and partly because of the autonomous nature of 
the growth of our neighbors at present. 
